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Sevilla FC is currently fighting to avoid relegation in La Liga. The club is also in last place in La Liga’s Squad Cost Limit. Although the record winner of the UEFA Europa League has enjoyed success for a long time, the club is currently in a financially and sportingly precarious situation. This article analyses how Sevilla FC was able to develop from European successes into a financially struggling club in the relegation battle within a very short period of time.
From Talent Factory to Declining Assets: How Transfer Strategy and La Liga’s SCL Crippled Sevilla FC
Sevilla FC experienced the best years in the club’s history between 2013 and 2016. The club has won the Europa League three times in a row and thus qualified for the Champions League three times in a row. The club is at its peak in sporting terms, even though it has won the UEFA Cup (the predecessor of the Europa League) twice in its long history and has also won national cups. But even after that, the club remained very successful in sporting terms, reaching, among other things, the Champions League quarter-finals in the 2017/18 season and the Copa del Rey final in the same season. During this time, the many successes also increase the market values within the team. In the 2016/17 season, Sevilla FC achieved the highest market value in the club’s history at Transfermarkt with 270 million euros. Although the club repeatedly sells players for large sums to generate revenue, it consistently finds a very good approach for departing players. The man pulling the strings is Ramón Rodríguez Verdejo and is simply called Monchi. Monchi played for the club himself as a player between 1990 and 1999 and subsequently became a club legend, especially as an official. Shortly after retiring, he became sporting director and overhauled all youth work and the scouting system at Sevilla FC. During its term of office, which runs until 2017, the club won the Europa League five times and the Copa del Rey twice. Thanks to his good scouting, he continually discovers new players, which the club develops further and later sells to larger clubs at a higher price.
After Monchi leaves the club in 2017, this system begins to crumble. Although the club continues to generate large revenues, it also spends all the money it earns. The club also changes its transfer strategy so that experienced players are brought in, which should guarantee sporting success. However, these lack the sales and development potential, which means that the team’s market value continues to decline and transfer revenues also decline. In Monchi’s last season, income from transfers was 93 million euros with a transfer balance of 11.5 million euros. In the first two seasons without Monchi, its system continues to operate with revenues of 82 million and 94 million euros, with a positive transfer balance of 4 million and 13 million euros. But after the first two years without Monchi, a change in strategy takes place. Sevilla FC has record revenues of €131 million and is investing €189 million in the transfer market in the same season. These are largely invested in established players, such as Luuk de Jong, Lucas Ocampos, Rony Lopes or Diego Carlos. Years later, these players had little resale value, which contributes to a sharp drop in transfer revenue in the following years. This also means that the depreciation of player values coupled with a lack of revenue causes squad costs to rise sharply, which is also a problem with Juventus’ finances, for example, which was examined in more detail in the following article. In addition, the coronavirus outbreak will also put a strain on the revenue side in the following two years. Sevilla FC is still able to cushion this with sporting successes, which later diminish, causing the club to suffer permanently economically. This can also be well illustrated by looking at the development of market value of the cadre. When Monchi leaves the club, it is at 270 million euros and has fallen to 140 million euros by the current season. In this negative spiral, this means that the sporting successes just described can no longer be achieved and revenues continue to decline.
A Rapid Revenue Collapse: Why Sevilla’s Operating Income Has Fallen Off a Cliff
In addition to the lack of additional income from transfers, sales also fell due to a lack of sporting success. Sevilla FC has experienced an extreme decline in sales in recent years. While the club achieved sales of 214 million euros in the 2022/23 season, this fell to 175 million euros in the following season and to 115 million euros in the 2024/25 season. This means that sales have almost halved within the last two years. Although Sevilla has also been able to reduce its spending, the club has suffered heavy losses in all three years. While there was only a loss of 19 million euros in the 2022/23 season, this rose to 81 million euros in the following season and was now reduced again to 54 million euros in the previous season. This constant loss costs the club a lot of equity and cash flow, which can also be seen in the balance sheet for the 2024/25 season. This season, 96 million in cash flow was burned. This means, conversely, that Sevilla FC fell from 135 million euros to 36 million euros. The development of equity speaks a much worse language. In the 2022/23 season, the club’s equity was slightly positive at 13 million euros. While this is not a large amount, equity fell dramatically in the two seasons that followed. In the 2023/24 season it was already -69 million euros and in the previous season it was -123 million euros. Negative equity indicates over-indebtedness in book terms. The figures thus express that Sevilla FC is facing financial disaster from heavy debt mixed with operational losses.
Another alarming measure is the percentage personnel costs of operational turnover. The high personnel costs, for example, were one reason for FC Barcelona’s high level of debt. At Sevilla FC, personnel costs in the 2024/25 season amounted to 114 million euros. This represents 99% of turnover. A healthy value for a football club is between 60% and 70%. It is true that personnel costs were reduced by EUR 45 million (equivalent to a decrease of 28%) compared to the previous season. However, sales fell more sharply by 60 million euros. This also increased the percentage ratio from 91% to 98%. The figure was already an alarming figure in the 2023/24 season, but the percentage increase is making it increasingly dramatic and means that Sevilla FC needs permanent external capital to cover all further costs beyond personnel costs. La Liga is trying to limit these personnel costs with the Squad Cost Limit, which we have already analyzed in another article.
The Costly Stadium Rebuild: A Barcelona‑Style Gamble Sevilla Can’t Afford
As Spain will serve as the main host of the 2030 World Cup, many stadiums in Spain are currently being modernized or newly built. This also applies to Sevilla FC, which wants to demolish the Estadio Ramon-Sanchez-Pizjuan in 2027 and build a new one on the same site. Having already addressed the various reasons for Sevilla FC’s downfall, the construction of a new stadium is another point that is putting a financial strain on the club. Here, Sevilla FC chooses a similar model to FC Barcelona, whose financial situation we have already analyzed in the following article. The club raises external capital to cover the costs and then wants to finance these costs through additional revenue from the new stadium. The club hopes to generate additional revenue of €18 million per year by increasing capacity from 44,000 to 55,000, as well as additional revenue from expanded hospital facilities. The cost of the new stadium is €220 million. However, in order for the stadium to generate the additional revenue, the club says it must be used all year round and should therefore not be used exclusively for the club’s home games. Construction is expected to take approximately 2.5 years, during which time Sevilla FC plans to play in the Olympic Stadium for two years. This also has a higher capacity and could then lead to the club already generating additional revenue on match days during the alternate period. In principle, it can be said that the new stadium construction can open up important new sources of income, but due to the currently very precarious situation, it is highly doubtful how Sevilla FC intends to finance the new construction.
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Future Outlook: Can Sevilla FC Escape Financial Meltdown and Sporting Decline?
Sevilla FC is in a very bleak financial situation, which also affects their performance on the pitch. In the current season, the club is fighting against relegation. Overall, the club is in a downward spiral of costs that are being saved more slowly than revenue, which is also falling sharply. This makes the club less and less efficient and sportingly successful, which then further reduces revenue. The new stadium building is definitely a sensible new source of income, but the club is already in such a precarious financial situation that financing the new building seems impossible. If the club fails to increase revenues significantly or reduce costs significantly within a very short period of time, then it will soon be bankrupt. The club’s path can therefore only go up if it can combine a savings course with the training of young, affordable players with high resale potential. This is imperative in order to quickly turn the operating loss into profits and make the club profitable again. This distinguishes Sevilla FC, for example, from FC Barcelona, which has much higher debts but remains very profitable operationally.
